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Abstract
Neural network methods have facilitated the unifi -
cation of several unfortunate splits in psychology, 
including nature versus nurture. We review the 
contributions of this methodology and then dis-
cuss tentative network theories of caring behavior, 
of uncaring behavior, and of how the frontal lobes 
are involved in the choices between them. The 
implications of our theory are optimistic about 
the prospects of society to encourage the human 
potential for caring.
Key words: neural networks, nature, nurture, 
caring behavior, frontal lobe.
Resumen
Los métodos de redes neuronales han facilitado la 
unifi cación de varias desafortunadas divisiones en 
psicología, incluida la de naturaleza versus crianza. 
Se revisan aquí las contribuciones de esta metodo-
logía, para luego examinar las propuestas teóricas 
basadas en redes acerca de la conducta de cuidado, 
la conducta de descuido y cómo los lóbulos fronta-
les están involucrados en las elecciones entre éstas. 
Las implicaciones de nuestra teoría son optimistas 
acerca de los prospectos de la sociedad para forta-
lecer el potencial humano para el cuidado.
Palabras clave: redes neuronales, naturaleza, 
crianza, conducta de cuidado, lóbulo frontal.
The interdependent web
Nature versus nurture? This is one of the many false 
splits and dichotomies that have retarded research 
in psychology at different times in its history. Tryon 
(1993, 1995) summed up some of these dichoto-
mies as follows:
(1) Mind vs. Body; (2) Biological (Nature) vs. Envi-
ronmental (Nurture); (3) Language Learning (Innate 
vs. Learned); (4) Subjective vs. Objective; (5) Lear-
ning vs. Development; (6) Holistic vs. Atomistic; (7) 
Individual (Ideographic) vs. General (Nomothetic); 
(8) Experimental vs. Naturalistic; (9) Awareness vs. 
Conditioning; (10) Freedom vs. Determinism; (11) 
Human (Cognitive) vs. Animal (Associative) Learning 
(Tryon, 1995, p. 303).
Why should we care about these academic dis-
tinctions? They are of more than academic inter-
est: they have infl uenced the popular culture by 
promoting a fragmented view of human beings. 
Ultimately, such fragmenting of our consciousness 
tends to encourage the development of toxic “us 
versus them” relationships between people (see 
also Papini, 2008).
But since about the mid-1980s, there has been 
a surge of interdisciplinary research fi ndings that 
promise to heal some of these psychological splits. 
The development of modern brain imaging tech-
niques has spurred the growth of cognitive neu-
roscience and greater productive collaboration 
between experimental psychologists and neuros-
cientists. The development of modern computa-
tional neural network (or connectionist) techniques 
has fostered a greater understanding of dynamical 
 interconnections among elements and subsystems 
of the mind. The new disciplines that have emer-
ged—cognitive neuroscience and neural network 
theory—have the potential to infl uence popular 
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culture in ways that promote better mutual un-
derstanding.
In particular, biologically relevant and plausible 
neural networks have helped to heal Tryon’s dicho-
tomy (2), namely, nature versus nurture. The naive 
conventional belief is that a theoretical, quantita-
tive approach to understanding human personality 
would favor genetic over environmental causes. 
But the naive belief is wrong because the brain’s 
function is to mediate between the internal world of 
the body and the external world of the environment. 
And in order to mediate successfully, the brain is 
able to change as a result of experience. As the 
neural network pioneer Stephen Grossberg put it, 
“brains self-organize on a relatively fast time scale 
through development and life-long learning, and do 
so in response to non-stationary, or rapidly chan-
ging, statistical properties of their environments” 
(Grossberg, 2000, p. 244).
Neural networks, because they are built on the 
mathematics of dynamical systems, treat genetic 
and environmental infl uences as interacting parts 
of a seamless whole, or as some religions call it, an 
“interdependent web.” Genetics provides behavio-
ral tendencies, whereas environments infl uence the 
expression of these tendencies. The enhancement 
or inhibition of any genetic capacity is a function of 
the interaction of inherited temperament and perso-
nality with experiences. These experiences affect 
temperament and personality, and thus behavior, 
by altering brain chemistry and structure (see Eisler 
& Levine, 2002).
What neural networks are and are not
The “Chunnel” across the English Channel between 
Britain and France was built from both ends, with 
laser technology used to make them meet in the 
middle. By analogy, if one wants to understand the 
biological basis of human behavior, one needs to 
go back and forth between the biology of the brain 
and behavioral functions, and try to get them to 
“meet in the middle.”
If the biology of the brain is analogous to “Bri-
tain,” and the psychology of behavior, emotion, 
and cognition to “France,” then the growing inter-
disciplinary fi eld of neural networks, along with 
cognitive neuroscience, is one of the “tunnels” 
between them (for a history and overview, see 
Levine, 2000). Neural networks are mathematical 
and computer models that are composed of simu-
lated brain regions, or in some cases psychological 
constructs, and connections between those regions 
or constructs. At the same time, the networks are 
designed with the goal of achieving with computer 
simulations some results that can be interpreted as 
analogous to some set of behavioral data.
So how is a “neural network” defi ned? The best 
defi nition so far, though a very imperfect one, is 
probably the one developed in 1988 by a team of 
neural network experts from a study commissio-
ned by the United States Department of Defense 
(DARPA):
a neural network is a system composed of many… pro-
cessing elements operating in parallel whose function 
is determined by network structure, connection streng-
ths, and the processing performed at computing ele-
ments or nodes. ... Neural network architectures are 
inspired by the architecture of biological nervous 
systems, which use many simple processing elements 
operating in parallel...
This defi nition is not completely satisfactory 
because not all mathematically studied neural 
networks can be parceled cleanly into nodes and 
connections: some are studied more as continuous, 
even chaotic, processes (see, e.g., Freeman, 2003).
What do the nodes or elements in the DARPA 
defi nition mean? Typically, though not always, 
scientists conceptualize the nodes as large groups of 
neurons (brain cells). Experiments from neurophy-
siology laboratories have suggested that the electri-
cal patterns of single neurons and the biochemistry 
of the synapses between neurons are irregular in 
their organization. But if some irregularities at the 
levels of single neurons and synapses are averaged 
out across large groups or brain regions, regular 
connection patterns emerge that are important for 
behavior.
Sometimes nodes correspond to brain areas or 
specifi c cell types in those brain areas. At other 
times, when not enough is known about brain 
processes or when modeling at a functional level 
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is desired, nodes correspond to cognitive entities 
such as the memory of a specifi c word, the tendency 
to approach a specifi c object, or the intensity of a 
specifi c emotion.
Biologists and clinicians frequently talk in-
formally of the “neural networks involved in this 
or that function,” meaning networks in the actual 
brain: that usage is accurate enough. But what is 
inaccurate and misleading is the tendency of some 
researchers to restrict the term “neural network” 
to a particular type of network structure that has 
become popular. These structures are multilayer 
(usually three-layer) feedforward networks that 
learn prescribed responses from a set of training 
data (Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986). Such net-
works are often called back propagation networ-
ks because learning takes place by propagation 
of changes in connection weights back from the 
output nodes of the network to other nodes re-
presenting stored input pattern categories. Back 
propagation networks are widely used in both in-
dustrial applications (e.g., White & Sofge, 1992) 
and neuropsychological models (e.g., O’Reilly, 
Noelle, Braver, & Cohen, 2002). Yet this class 
of networks are not the type that best captures 
either the structure of the brain (which has exten-
sive feedback connections almost everywhere) 
or the important subfunctions of mental processes 
(see Levine, 2000, for review).
In fact, some more biologically realistic, and 
functionally rich, neural network architectures ha-
ve been inspired by organizational principles that 
tailor anatomical structure to the required psycho-
logical functions. Grossberg (2000) and Levine 
(2000) extensively discuss how such principles 
have been used to build models of complex cog-
nitive functions from models of simpler functions. 
Some networks based on such principled models 
are able to self-organize their responses instead of 
requiring explicit training.
As neural networks have evolved, the resulting 
models have covered an expanded range of psy-
chological data (see Levine, 2002b). In the 1970s, 
network modeling was most advanced in the area 
of visual perception, and next most advanced in se-
rial learning and short-term memory. The early and 
middle 1980s saw the growth of models of animal 
learning and conditioning data. The late 1980s and 
early 1990s, buoyed by the interdisciplinary cogni-
tive science revolution, saw early models of high 
level cognition, including language acquisition, 
and its breakdown in various mental disorders. All 
these areas are still active, and now a few models 
have appeared in social psychology. By now, while 
there is little agreement on the “right” model for 
any of these phenomena, the available network 
tools available and empirical knowledge are sophis-
ticated enough that practically any area of psycho-
logy, whether cognitive, behavioral, physiological, 
social, developmental, or clinical, is amenable to 
neural network modeling.
Variability of human behavior
By now there is considerable neurophysiological 
evidence that strengths of many synapses between 
pairs of neurons change when the neurons on both 
sides of the synapse are repeatedly electrically ac-
tive at the same time (Bliss & Lømo, 1973; Byrne, 
1987; Kandel & Tauc, 1965). Psychologists inter-
ested in learning suggested the idea of synaptic 
change long before neurophysiologists observed 
it (Freud, 1895; Hebb, 1949).
The brain’s plasticity is the key to the marvelo-
us adaptability of human beings. As we have built 
more layers onto the neural structures inherited 
from other mammals, the amount of plasticity 
has grown radically. The parts of the brain most 
responsible for our linguistic and intellectual and 
cultural development have the most plastic con-
nections of all.
During the critical period of childhood, the plas-
ticity of neural circuits is greater than at other times 
and is supplemented by the ability to lay down 
brand new synapses. But the circuits involving the 
frontal lobes, the part of our brains most implicated 
in planning and moral development, remain fairly 
plastic through adolescence (Webster, Weickert, 
Herman, and Kleinman, 2002). And even the adult 
brain is subject to strengthening or weakening of 
existing synapses, which may underlie signifi cant 
character development through experience.
Our capacity at birth to be raised to learn En-
glish, Italian, Chinese, or Hindi, for example, is a 
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function of the plasticity of connections represen-
ting specifi c sound patterns playing on the hard-
wired structures involved in what has been called 
a language instinct (Pinker, 1994). The brain’s role 
in the development of cultural mores and customs 
is less well understood. Yet cultural mores are 
likely to be a similar blend of plasticity of specifi c 
connections with hard-wired general functional 
capabilities. That is, we have the universal instinct 
to create cultures and to make rules governing in-
terpersonal relations within these cultures, but the 
content of these rules is extremely fl exible. Our 
brains can, for example, create rules that either en-
courage hierarchies of dominance held together by 
force, or caring partnership relations held together 
by the rewards of pleasure (Eisler, 1995).
What do neural networks tell us about all this? 
Neural networks are a metaphor for the fact that all 
of mental life is dynamically interrelated. Percep-
tions, categorizations, beliefs, emotions, plans, and 
actions cannot be fully separated from each other, 
but instead form an interdependent web. Results 
from experimental psychology show, for example, 
that cognitive ambiguity can lead to emotional dis-
comfort (Elkin & Leippe, 1986; Harmon-Jones et 
al., 1996), and that emotional biases can infl uence 
how categories are chosen (DeHouwer et al., 2002; 
Pashler & Medin, 2002). Both learning and indi-
vidual differences strongly infl uence the results of 
these interrelationships in model neural networks, 
as they do in actual people.
In addition, some specifi c neural network ar-
chitectures can function as useful metaphors for 
specifi c human attitude tendencies. One neural net-
work that my colleagues and I developed serves as a 
metaphor for the human tendency to get stuck in ha-
bitual yet unrewarding behaviors (Levine & Prueitt, 
1989). Another network serves as a metaphor for 
jumping between polar emotional opposites (such 
as love and hate) (Grossberg, 1972; Grossberg & 
Schmajuk, 1987). But there is also a neural network 
metaphor for the creative process that encourages 
self-actualization (Levine, 1994)!
What can a neural network, or computational, 
approach add to our understanding of human ps-
ychology over and above what can be gained by 
just thinking intelligently about mental processes? 
Neural networks do not change our view of the 
brain and behavior dramatically. They merely 
help us tackle problems of human behavior using a 
systems approach. This means that each of our per-
sonalities, like any other complex system, is seen 
as a web of different subsystems, all infl uencing 
each other dynamically but each somewhat auto-
nomous. These systems are simulated and studied 
through the mathematical theory of dynamical 
systems (also sometimes known as chaos theory). 
This is the study of how interacting variables in a 
complex system infl uence each other over time, 
and applies to a wide range of other types of phy-
sical and social systems (Abraham, Abraham, & 
Shaw, 1992).
Moreover, the process of building theories and 
computer models helps focus our understanding on 
the detailed requirements for an organism’s intelli-
gent functioning in a complex, changing, and not 
fully predictable world. In particular, neural network 
modeling inspired Grossberg’s (2000) notion of the 
complementary brain. He coined this term to mean 
that intelligent functioning often depends on jointly 
satisfying two sets of requirements that are comple-
mentary, and somewhat paradoxical. For example, 
in learning and memory, we need to be open to 
learning new information without forgetting some 
important information that we learned previously. 
In conditioning, we need to process cognitive in-
formation and also to be sensitive to motivational 
feedback. And in visual perception, we need to de-
fi ne boundaries and also to defi ne surfaces between 
the boundaries.
Neural networks and the nature-nurture 
inquiry
The “complementary brain” theme can be extended 
still further to personality and to social interactions. 
For example, the interdisciplinary social scientist 
Gerald Cory described the function of individuals 
within society as a constant effort to mediate bet-
ween the complementary claims of self-interest 
and of concern for others (Cory, 1999, 2002). He 
rooted both self-interest and altruism in different 
evolutionary programs based in different brain pa-
thways carried over respectively from reptiles and 
Rev Avances Psicologia_julio_28.indd   85 7/31/08   4:48:14 PM
Daniel S. Levine
 86Avances en Psicología Latinoamericana/Bogotá (Colombia)/Vol. 26(1)/pp. 82-98/2008/ISSN1794-4724 
from nonhuman mammals, pathways the pionee-
ring behavioral neuroscientist Paul MacLean had 
mapped earlier (MacLean, 1990). Cory repeatedly 
used system-theoretic terms like “algorithms” to 
describe these processes. One of the current goals 
of my research group is to develop computational 
neural network models of the large number of inte-
racting brain processes involved in the tug-of-war 
Cory described between altruism and selfi shness 
(see Levine, 2006).
How close are we to applying neural networks 
to a real understanding of human nature and nurtu-
re? Naturally, neural network models of behavioral 
functions have evolved “from the outside in.” Per-
ceptual and motor processes have been the easiest to 
understand, and more complex cognitive functions 
and cognitive-emotional interactions have taken 
longer to understand. And the interaction between 
nature and nurture takes us into the most complex 
of all this territory, the interrelationship between 
our brains and society.
Yet neural network modeling has come much 
closer to this goal since the mid-1990s. A few 
neural network models of social psychological 
phenomena are reviewed in the collection edited 
by Read and Miller (1998). These models cover 
person perception and impression formation; ste-
reotyping and social categorization; causal attri-
bution; personality and behavior; attitudes and 
beliefs, including cognitive dissonance; and social 
infl uence and group interaction. Other models in 
this same vein include Brown, Tumeo, Larey, and 
Paulus (1998); Brown and Paulus (2002); Leven 
and Levine (1996); Read and Miller (2002); and 
Van Rooy. (2003).
So our neural network theories are still far from 
capturing the essence of human nature and nurture. 
But progress has been rapid in the 1990s and early 
2000s, in empirical understanding of brain-beha-
vior relationships as well as in network modeling 
itself. Neuroscience has made increasing contact 
with social psychology, as epitomized by the emer-
gence of a distinct fi eld called social neuroscience 
(see, e.g., Cacioppo et al., 2002; Wood, 2003). To 
bridge the gap from neural networks to nature and 
nurture, we must fi rst revisit some neuropsycholo-
gical data about caring and uncaring behavior.
Caring and uncaring behavior
No set of questions is more basic or more prone to 
speculation than questions about our ethical and 
moral makeup. How much of a mixture are humans 
of selfi shness and altruism? Is our concern for 
others’ welfare simply disguised selfi shness — or 
is it a genuine part of a biologically derived need 
for community with others? If the latter, why are 
we so uncaring and violent much of the time, both 
as individuals and societies? These questions have 
long posed a challenge for behavioral biologists 
and psychologists steeped in the theory of natural 
selection.
Some degree of caring is essential for mammal, 
and particularly human, babies to survive—so 
caring for offspring clearly has an evolutionary 
function. But this does not explain the great va-
riance of parental behaviors. Nor does it explain 
the emergence of altruism toward those who are 
not blood relatives. Darwin himself doubted that 
survival of the fi ttest could account for altruism, 
because those who are more self-sacrifi cing would 
not have a survival or reproductive advantage over 
those who are more selfi sh (Darwin, 1871/1981, 
p. 163).
This insight has led evolutionary scholars to 
develop a variety of extensions of the natural se-
lection paradigm. Some come from broader inter-
pretations of Darwin’s own work; for example, 
David Loye highlighted Darwin’s emphasis in 
The Descent of Man and other writings on love 
and cooperation rather than pure self-interest as a 
factor in mammalian, especially primate, evolution 
(Loye, 1999, 2002). He cited Darwin’s tracing of 
love and cooperation as offshoots of the sexual and 
parental instincts.
Probably the most widely known theory to ex-
plain cooperative behaviors (including empathy 
and caring) has been group selection. As Bateson 
(2000, p. 19) put it: “... some assemblages of indivi-
duals may, through their concerted efforts, generate 
an outcome that puts their group at an advantage 
over other groups.”
Empathy and caring within a group facilitate 
cooperative activities and so provide a clear survi-
val advantage for that group. Yet group selection 
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still does not explain why caring, respectful pa-
renting, and altruism are sometimes present and 
sometimes absent.
Saying that evolution selects for a trait does not 
tell us what the biological or neuropsychological 
mechanisms are for expressing that trait. Nor does it 
shed light on what environmental contexts enhance 
or suppress that trait. Such contextual knowledge 
is required to draw conclusions about how the 
trait affects, and is affected by, social and cultural 
interactions.
In other words, we need to move from questions 
about genes to questions about gene expression: to 
the physical and social environment that will lead 
to the expression or inhibition of the human ca-
pacity for caring and altruistic behaviors. Neither 
nature alone nor nurture alone provides adequate 
explanations for important features of our persona-
lities or our characteristic action patterns (see the 
articles in Levine, 2002a).
We now sketch three competing characteristic 
classes of neural activity patterns that may underlie 
caring or uncaring behaviors in humans, following 
the development in Eisler and Levine (2002). Ba-
sed on the work of several generations of behavio-
ral biologists, we identify these pattern classes as 
tend-and-befriend, fi ght-or-fl ight, and dissociative. 
Each one of these pattern types is part of every 
healthy person’s genetic makeup. Each serves an 
adaptive purpose and therefore has been selected 
for in evolution. Yet the circumstances of each of 
their expression, and the contexts in which each 
one is expressed, are heavily dependent on social 
conditioning and not necessarily adaptive.
We outline some tentative neural pathways that, 
as they become refi ned by better understanding, 
will be subject to neural network investigation. A 
key brain region for deciding between the compe-
ting expressions of different behavior patterns is the 
underside of our frontal lobes – as neuroscientists 
call it, the orbitofrontal cortex (or ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex). This is the part of the brain that 
the neuroscientist Walle Nauta identifi ed as our 
“censor” which fi lters out acceptable plans (Nauta, 
1971). In his widely known somatic marker theory, 
Antonio Damasio described that same brain region 
as essential for effective decision making based 
on our bodily needs (Damasio, 1994). It is the ma-
jor communication link between Paul MacLean’s 
“three brains”: the “crocodile, horse, and person” 
from our evolutionary history that we bring to ex-
pression of our deepest selves (MacLean, 1962).
First we look at some possible neural pathways 
for caring behavior. Then we look at some neural 
pathways for fi ght-or-fl ight behavior, noting that 
noncaring behavior can also take on the form of 
withdrawal or dissociation rather than fi ghting. 
Then we sketch a theory for how the orbitofrontal 
cortex might mediate the choices between such 
overall behavior patterns.
Neural pathways for caring: Role 
of oxytocin and vasopressin
There appears to be in all mammals (it has been 
studied most extensively in rodents) a system of 
neurotransmitters and peptide hormones, in which 
the peptide oxytocin is particularly pivotal, for 
affect regulation and mediation of social bonding. 
While this neural system has been most studied 
in mother-child interactions and in female-male 
sexual pair bonding, there is some evidence that the 
same system also operates in other bonding rela-
tionships such as non-kin friendships, as well as in 
relaxation responses and general stress reduction.
The social psychologist Shelley Taylor and her 
colleagues (Taylor et al., 2000) described what they 
called the tend-and-befriend response that women 
and female animals often employ as a response 
to stress, in preference to the traditionally studied 
fight-or-flight response. The tend-and-befriend 
response, mediated by the brain’s oxytocin system, 
includes both the tending of offspring and social 
bonding between females (mutual grooming for 
nonhuman animals, friendship for humans) around 
mutual protection of selves and offspring. Other 
results we will cite hint that these mechanisms exist 
in male animals as well, despite gender differences 
in amounts of some biochemical substances invol-
ved. For this reason, even though Taylor applied 
the term tend-and-befriend specifi cally to grooming 
between female animals and friendship between 
women, I use the term for bonding responses in 
general.
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Rewards and positive emotions have long been 
associated with the neurotransmitter dopamine. 
Yet whereas dopamine is involved in a wide range 
of positive emotions, oxytocin is specifi cally im-
portant for positive emotions relating to social and 
family connections. This hormone, found only in 
mammals, was fi rst discovered to be essential for 
maternal behaviors such as uterine contraction and 
milk ejection. But Thomas Insel, James Winslow, 
and their colleagues discovered that oxytocin has 
broader importance for bonding, in male as well 
as female animals (Insel, 1992; Insel & Winslow, 
1998; Winslow, Shapiro, Carter, & Insel, 1993).
Insel and Winslow studied two species of North 
American rodents that are closely related but have 
radically different social organization: the prairie 
vole, which is monogamous with strong male-
female pair bonding and both parents involved 
in care of young, and the montane vole, which is 
promiscuous with fathers uninvolved with young. 
They found that oxytocin attaches to receptor mo-
lecules in reward-related areas of the brain in the 
pair-bonding prairie vole but not in the non-bonding 
montane vole. (Young and Wang, 2004, note that 
the two species do not differ signifi cantly in total 
brain oxytocin level, only in where oxytocin binds 
in the brain.). Also, in female prairie voles, pair 
bonding—with the fi rst male they smell after rea-
ching puberty—can be induced by direct injections 
of oxytocin, and abolished by drugs that reduce 
the amount of oxytocin (Insel, Winslow, Wang, & 
Young, 1998).
Another peptide hormone, vasopressin (which is 
closely related chemically to oxytocin), is particu-
larly important for pair bonding in male prairie voles 
(Young & Wang, 2004). Vasopressin is particularly 
related to male aggression in defense of the mate and 
young, and to paternal care (Insel et al., 1998). Yet 
other results argue against a neat gender dichotomy 
between these two hormones. Cho, DeVries, Wi-
lliams, and Carter (1999) showed that while oxyto-
cin is more associated with maternal behavior and 
vasopressin with paternal behavior, pair bonding 
could be abolished in either male or female prairie 
voles by drugs that blocked brain receptors for either 
of the two peptides. This suggests that both peptides 
are required for pair bonding in both sexes.
Insel’s group has bred male mice (which are 
closely related to voles) that lack a gene for produ-
cing oxytocin and found that these animals are se-
lectively defi cient in social memory. Unlike normal 
mice, they cannot remember the smell of another 
mouse with whom they have engaged in affi liati-
ve behavior (e.g., sex, play, or grooming), despite 
intact memory for other kinds of smells (Ferguson 
et al., 2000). Vasopressin has also been found to be 
critical for social memory in mice (for a review, see 
Bielsky & Young, 2004).
Social recognition and bonding pathways in 
humans and other primates are less well worked 
out than in rodents, but the evidence so far points 
to roles for oxytocin and vasopressin similar to tho-
se in voles. For example, Rosenblum et al. (2002) 
studied two closely related species of macaque 
monkeys with analogous differences to those bet-
ween prairie and montane voles: bonnet macaques 
that tend to be gregarious, affi liative, and affecti-
vely stable, and pigtail macaques that tend to be 
emotionally volatile and socially distant. These 
researchers found that the more affi liative bonnet 
macaques had higher levels of oxytocin in their ce-
rebrospinal fl uid than did the less affi liative pigtail 
macaques. The bonnets also had lower levels of a 
substance called CRF that is important in the pro-
duction of the stress-related hormone cortisol.
In humans, Kosfeld et al. (2005) found that 
intranasal administration of oxytocin to men pla-
ying a simulated investment game increased their 
ability to trust their partners. The same hormone 
has been found to modulate neural circuits for 
social cognition and for fear in humans (Kirsch et 
al., 2005). The evidence for a social bonding role 
of vasopressin in humans is less clear, but Fries, 
Ziegler, Kurian, Jacoris, and Pollak (2005) found 
urinary levels of both peptides to be below normal 
in children reared in orphanages with too few so-
cial contacts.
Other results suggest that oxytocin inhibits 
fight-or-flight responses to stress. By contrast, 
oxytocin promotes responding to stress by see-
king positive social interactions and nonnoxious 
sensory stimulation, as Taylor et al. (2000) studied 
in female animals. Uvnäs-Moberg (1997, 1998) 
reviewed evidence from her laboratory and others 
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that oxytocin administration in both male and fema-
le rats counteracts many typical physiological and 
behavioral effects of stress. For example, oxytocin 
causes decrease in blood pressure and in the amount 
of cortisol. 
The physiological antistress effects of oxytocin 
are known to occur in association with both lacta-
tion and sexual intercourse. Oxytocin is also likely 
to be released by other forms of pleasurable social 
contact, such as mutual grooming in animals and 
supportive friendship in humans. Indeed Turner, 
Altemus, Enos, Cooper, and McGuinness (1999) 
found that oxytocin levels in the blood of women 
who had never been pregnant increased in response 
to relaxation massage.
As an approach to a later, more complete, theory, 
one can assume that both oxytocin and dopamine 
are involved in brain mechanisms common to a 
range of caring or bonding responses across di-
fferent species of mammals. This generates a fi rst 
approximation to a neural network theory of human 
bonding responses based on the simpler brains of 
voles and their involvement in male-female pair 
bonding (Figure 1). Our starting point is the results 
of Insel et al. (1998) showing that oxytocin and 
vasopressin both have different binding patterns 
in the brain of the pair-bonding prairie vole than in 
the brain of the non-pair-bonding montane vole. 
We also build on the results of Cho et al. (1999) on 
gender differences in prairie voles.
Our theory of bonding (Figure 1) is based on 
the assumption that brain regions to which oxyto-
cin and vasopressin bind more in the prairie vole 
than in the montane vole are regions that play roles 
in bonding (“tend-and-befriend”) behavior. Insel 
et al. (1998) reviewed data suggesting that the key 
area for oxytocin binding is the nucleus accumbens, 
well known to be a key part of the dopamine-mo-
dulated stimulus-response system. The key area for 
vasopressin bonding seems to be an area called the 
diagonal band that produces the neurotransmitter 
acetylcholine, which is believed to be involved in 
selective attention and to modulate memory con-
solidation (Everitt & Robbins, 1997). These data 
hormones
hormones
Vasopressin
Oxytocin
Diagonal 
band
Primary reward
Lateral 
hypothalamus
Nucleus 
accumbens
Ventral 
pallidum
PPTN
Midbrain 
dopamine 
neurons
Acetylcholine 
(selective attention)
Hippocampus 
(short-term memory)
Olfactory cortex 
(social stimuli)
Dopamine
Reward system
Figure 1. Proposed network for bonding effects of oxytocin and vasopressin. PPTN is the pedunculopontine tegmental 
nucleus, a part of the midbrain. Ventral pallidum is a part of the basal ganglia. Both of these areas along with the 
lateral hypothalamus and nucleus accumbens are part of the neural circuit for processing rewards. Arrows represent 
excitatory connections; fi lled circles represent inhibitory connections; semicircles represent modifi able connections. 
(Reprinted from Eisler and Levine, 2002, with the permission of Kluwer Academic Publishers.)
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suggest complementary roles for the two peptides 
in bonding, with oxytocin more related to the part 
of the process that drives behavior via reward, and 
vasopressin more related to the part of the process 
that focuses attention on relevant stimuli—in this 
case, on the opposite-sex vole with which the ani-
mal is forming a pair bond.
The other parts of the network of Figure 1 (par-
ticular regions of the hypothalamus, midbrain, and 
basal ganglia) are inspired by the previous neural 
network model by Brown, Bullock, and Grossberg 
(1999) of how behaviors can become conditioned 
due to the effects of unexpected rewards. This net-
work illustrates some of the major brain pathways 
likely to be involved in any type of conditioned 
response. This includes partner preference, a con-
ditioned association whereby the smell (for prairie 
voles) or visual appearance (for primates) of a 
particular fellow member of one’s species becomes 
linked to social and/or sexual rewards.
As our modeling proceeds from voles to hu-
mans, the kind of conditioning that occurs will of 
course be far more complex. It will also be more 
susceptible to change through new experiences 
and learning. However, the social factors peculiar 
to humans probably build on the same underlying 
mechanisms that operate in nonhuman mammals 
(see MacLean, 1990).
In addition, humans undergo conditioning not 
just about whom to bond with, but about how strong 
is the tendency to bond with anybody, as opposed to 
engaging in fi ght-or-fl ight or dissociative behavior. 
In humans, much of this conditioning is socially 
and culturally based (e.g., pressures to bond with 
some groups of people and not bond with others). 
To see how this might occur, we fi rst need to review 
how fi ght-or-fl ight and dissociative behaviors are 
organized.
Neural pathways for fi ght-or-fl ight 
and dissociation
The fi ght-or-fl ight response involves various parts 
of the brain as well as the endocrine glands, the 
immune system, and the cardiovascular system, 
which coordinate to produce characteristic bio-
chemical changes in response to unpleasant or 
potentially threatening environmental events. This 
interconnected system serves useful functions in 
evolution: its hyperarousal prepares the body for 
either fi ghting the stressful event or withdrawing 
from it.
Hyperarousal involves an increase in activity 
of the brain’s system for distribution of the neu-
rotransmitter norepinephrine. Norepinephrine is 
the transmitter most involved with “pumping 
up” the brain’s connections to the cardiovascular 
and endocrine systems involved in active respon-
ses to stressful situations. Normally, when the 
stressful events have ceased, the stress-based pro-
fi le disappears and the body recovers its pre-stress 
biochemical confi guration. When the stresses are 
too severe or persistent, however, as with children 
who are physically or sexually abused repeatedly, 
the recovery cannot take place fast enough to keep 
up with the new stresses that occur (Perry et al., 
1995). The child may survive into adulthood, but 
damaging changes in the brain remain. Specifi cally, 
there is sensitization of the pathways in the nervous 
system and other bodily organs (including the heart 
and endocrine glands) responsible for fi ght-or-
fl ight responses to danger. This means the person 
becomes more likely to have an arousal response to 
stimuli milder than the initial traumatic event.
The dissociative response to stress is opposite to 
hyperarousal in that it involves freezing rather than 
fi ghting or fl eeing. Dissociation is often accompa-
nied by depression or a tendency toward fantasy or 
daydreaming. It helps account for the withdrawal 
of some traumatized individuals into addiction to 
alcohol or drugs.
The long-term physiological changes in chil-
dren exhibiting a dissociative pattern have not 
yet been extensively studied. However, the key 
neural transmitter for the expression of that pat-
tern is known to be dopamine (Perry et al., 1995), 
the transmitter mainly involved with reward 
(both from natural positive reinforcers and addic-
tive drugs). Rather than mobilizing the organism 
toward a fi ghting or other coping response, the 
dissociative response mobilizes the organism to 
withdraw emotionally from the current aversive 
situation and try to “feel good.” In contrast to 
the tendency of hyperaroused children to show a 
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resting rapid heart rate, dissociated children tend 
toward hyperactivity of the vagus nerve which 
slows down the heart.
In the Perry studies, neither hyperarousal nor 
dissociative responses were uniformly found in 
all abused children. Each was more likely to occur 
in children who had a family history of particular 
types of disorders. This could signal inherited ge-
netic predispositions, or it could signal patterns of 
emotional and physical response passed on from 
generation to generation through both conscious 
and unconscious learning.
Perry and his colleagues point out that the bra-
in is malleable all through life, but much more 
so in the early years. Neural transmitter changes 
that infl uence learning in adult life actually impinge 
on neuron and nerve pathway growth in the young 
child. And what happens is that “states become 
traits” (Perry et al., 1995).
Fight-or-flight and dissociative responses 
both involve activity of pathways connecting the 
hypothalamus with two important endocrine glands, 
the pituitary and adrenal glands. These pathways, 
known as the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenocor-
tical (HPA) axis, are involved in production of the 
hormone cortisol, typically produced in response 
to trauma.
Another substance that is typically released 
during fi ght-or-fl ight responses is the neurotrans-
mitter associated with arousal, norepinephrine. 
An extensive system has been mapped out of in-
teractions in the brain between these two major 
“fi ght-or-fl ight” substances, cortisol and norepi-
nephrine (Koob, 1999; Nestler, Alreja, & Aghaja-
nian, 1999). In addition to the HPA axis, this stress 
system, common to all mammals, includes parts 
of the amygdala, which process the degree of fear-
fulness associated with stimuli in the environment, 
and a part of the hypothalamus, the paraventricular 
nucleus (PVN). This stress system also includes 
loci in the brainstem that connect to the auto-
nomic nervous system, especially a cell nucleus 
called the locus coeruleus, which is the source of 
most of the norepinephrine synapses going to other 
parts of the brain.
Figure 2 shows a very simplifi ed picture of 
these interactions. The precursor to cortisol, cor-
ticotrophin releasing factor (CRF), is utilized as a 
Basolateral 
Amygdala
Central 
Amygdala
PVN
Locus 
Coeruleus
NOREPINEPHRINE
CRF
HYPOTHALAMUS
AMYGDALA
BRAINSTE
Behavioral, autonomic, 
endocrine responses to stress
Perception from cortex of 
fearful objects
Figure 2. Part of the interactive feedback system between CRF and norepinephrine stress-related systems in the brain. 
The basolateral amygdala receives inputs from the cortex and particularly responds to fear-inducing stimuli. These areas 
project via the central nucleus of the amygdala to the hypothalamus and autonomic regions of the brain stem, including 
the locus coeruleus. (Adapted from Eisler and Levine, 2002, with the permission of Kluwer Academic Publishers.)
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neural transmitter in some regions (Koob, 1999). 
There is pharmacological evidence that cortisol 
signals reach the norepinephrine-producing locus 
coeruleus, and that this nucleus in turn sends nore-
pinephrine signals to the amygdala and hypotha-
lamus. All those areas in turn generate behavioral 
responses to stress (fi ghting or fl eeing) as well as 
responses of both the HPA axis (endocrine) and 
the sympathetic autonomic nervous system (which 
affects the viscera). Thus a positive feedback loop 
tends to enhance and perpetuate the stress response 
once it gets going, unless the external environment 
becomes substantially less stressful. In the case 
of chronic stress, such as childhood abuse, the sys-
tem shown in Figure 2 becomes more excitable so 
that even mildly unpleasant events can generate 
activity in this positive feedback loop.
These chronic states of hyperarousal would 
typically get in the way of positive social interac-
tions, making the individual less receptive, more 
suspicious, and more prone to uncaring and even 
violent behaviors. This in turn would mean that ca-
ring from others would be discouraged, making the 
biochemical and neural responses associated with 
receiving caring less likely in a self-perpetuating 
cycle of chronic hyperexcitablility.
In dissociative responses, based on work sum-
marized by Perry et al. (1995) and Henry and Wang 
(1998), some of the same brain areas are likely to 
be involved as in fi ght-or-fl ight responses (Figure 
2) but with differences in biochemical activation 
patterns. For example, dissociated individuals 
should show low norepinephrine activity, combi-
ned with high cortisol (Koopman et al., 2003) and 
low oxytocin. The decrease in oxytocin means 
that chronically active dissociation, like fi ght-or-
fl ight, severely reduces the likelihood of caring 
behavior.
Dissociative responses involve dysfunctions of 
the reward system in which dopamine is the most 
important neurotransmitter. Dissociation then also 
typically means that the enduring rewards of po-
sitive social interactions are less available. Brain 
pathways by which this occurs are likely to be ana-
logous to pathways, not shown here, by which the 
reward system gets taken over by drugs of abuse 
(see Koob & LeMoal, 2001).
Role of the orbitofrontal cortex
The orbitofrontal cortex has long been recognized 
as the part of the human brain that uniquely media-
tes complex emotional responses including social 
responses. The famous 19th century patient Phineas 
Gage lost the ability to make plans and respond 
appropriately to social situations after a railroad 
accident in which an iron rod went through that 
part of his brain (see Damasio, 1994, for recons-
truction of the case). This region is unique in the 
extent of its connections both to high-order sen-
sory and association areas elsewhere in the cortex 
and to emotion-related, viscerally-projecting areas 
below the cortex (hypothalamus, amygdala, and 
basal ganglia).
Varied clinical and lesion studies suggest that the 
orbitomedial prefrontal cortex forms and sustains 
mental linkages between specifi c sensory events in 
the environment and positive or negative emotional 
states (see Öngür & Price, 2000, and Price, 1999). It 
is widely believed that, through a process that is still 
little understood, the prefrontal cortex links neural 
activity patterns in the sensory cortex that refl ect the 
infl uence of past sensory events with other neural 
activity patterns in subcortical regions that refl ect 
innate or learned expressions of emotional states.
It seems likely that the area of the brain media-
ting the emotional signifi cance a person attaches 
to objects and classes of objects also mediates the 
prevalence of large classes of emotionally based 
responses such as tend-and-befriend, fi ght-or-fl ight, 
and dissociation. This might occur through reci-
procal connections of the orbitomedial prefrontal 
cortex with several subcortical brain areas. One 
of them is the paraventricular nucleus (PVN) of 
the hypothalamus, which is important in control 
of endocrine secretion. Different parts of the PVN 
contain, among other hormones, oxytocin, vaso-
pressin, and CRF, the precursor to cortisol. The 
prefrontal cortex does not synapse directly on PVN, 
but synapses on other parts of the hypothalamus 
that in turn connect to PVN. In particular there 
are prefrontal connections to an area called the 
dorsomedial hypothalamus that sends inhibitory 
neurons to the PVN, as shown in Figure 3. These 
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dorsomedial-PVN connections use GABA, the 
brain’s commonest inhibitory transmitter.
Based on the simplifi ed schema in Figure 3, 
we suggest that at any given time the orbitofrontal 
cortex sends different strengths of inhibitory signals 
to the different parts of PVN that contain oxytocin 
or the cortisol precursor, and that this can be a means 
of infl uencing the relative likelihood of oxytocin-
mediated (tend-and-befriend) versus cortisol-me-
diated (fi ght-or-fl ight or dissociative) responses. 
Because the orbitofrontal cortex stores the emo-
tional or visceral signifi cance of social memories, 
the relative strengths of these pathways could be 
infl uenced by the amount of stress in the organism’s 
early experiences. The types of behavior that pre-
frontal regulation would tend to disinhibit are likely 
to be those encouraged by the society, family, and 
other people that a person interacts with.
A second set of prefrontal pathways for response 
selection is the loops between cortex, thalamus, and 
basal ganglia. These loops are a basis for several 
neural network models of reward-based behavioral 
regulation (e.g., Bullock et al., 1999; Monchi & 
Taylor, 1999). In particular, the strong connections 
between the prefrontal cortex and the nucleus ac-
cumbens (a primary site for both natural and drug-
related dopamine rewards) are likely to play a role in 
both tend-and-befriend and dissociative responses.
A third set of prefrontal pathways is the recipro-
cal connections with areas of the amygdala involved 
in emotional evaluation of stimuli (Schoenbaum, 
Setlow, Saddoris, & Gallagher, 2003). These areas 
(central and basolateral amygdala) are also part of the 
stress-related positive feedback loop of Figure 2.
The orbitofrontal cortex is infl uenced by neural 
signals from the same brain areas to which it sends 
signals. Connections to this prefrontal region from 
other parts of the cortex representing social stimuli 
should be strengthened or weakened with expe-
rience, including the previous stresses and previous 
responses. This in turn infl uences the tendency for 
a given social context to generate fi ght-or-fl ight, 
dissociative, or tend-and-befriend behavior.
Neural network theory-building
Understanding the dynamics involved in regula-
tion of fi ght-or-fl ight, dissociative, and tend-and-
befriend responses requires integrating disparate 
kinds of data. Animal lesion studies, human brain 
imaging studies, and clinical observations of abu-
sed children, for example, all involve different 
measurement techniques. As the wealth of scientifi c 
tools grows, so do the complexity of relating one 
result to another and the need for a common theore-
tical language. Increasingly, researchers in all areas 
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Vasopressin
Dorsomedial 
Hypothalamus
Orbitofronta 1
Stress
????
PVN
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Figure 3. Part of the stress-regulating interactions between the prefrontal cortex and hypothalamus, as discussed by 
Buijs and Van Eden (2000). Arrows denote excitatory synapses, circles inhibitory ones. PVNp = parvocellular part of 
paraventricular nucleus, PVNm = magnocellular part. Direct inhibitory connections between the PVN oxytocin and 
stress hormone systems are suggested but not verifi ed. (Adapted from Eisler and Levine, 2002, with the permission of 
Kluwer Academic Publishers.)
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of behavioral neuroscience have turned to neural 
network modeling, and drawn on the expertise of 
established schools of computational modelers, to 
provide just such a common language.
This type of modeling involves building theories 
of the behaviorally signifi cant dynamic interactions 
among interconnected brain regions, then, when 
these interactions have been specifi ed to some le-
vel of precision, simulating them on a computer. 
As recent neural network models have become 
more sophisticated, the mathematical dynamics of 
network variables have come closer to reproducing 
functional roles of specifi c brain areas (Levine, 
2000, Chapter 7).
The fi rst step in developing a plausible neural 
network theory of any complex behavioral process 
is to break it down into subprocesses that can be 
modeled by smaller networks. The next step is to 
synthesize these smaller network models and their 
interconnections into a larger model. Our even-
tual aim is to develop as accurate and predictive 
as possible a theory of how, and in what contexts, 
prefrontal-subcortical pathways infl uence selec-
tive expression among genetically derived neural 
patterns representing tend-and-befriend, fi ght-or-
fl ight, and dissociation. This will build on the net-
work theories instantiated in Figures 1-3 combined 
with networks for dissociative responses (Koob & 
LeMoal, 2001).
Conclusions: Family, society, 
and genes all matter
The results reviewed here indicate that selfish-
ness and altruism, ethical and unethical behavior, 
caring and noncaring interactions all result from 
complex interactions between nature and nurture. 
Quantitative simulation via biologically realistic neu-
ral networks should be useful in helping to unravel the 
dynamics of the interacting cortical and subcortical 
regions that instantiate these characteristic behavior 
patterns. Such networks can incorporate individual 
differences, whether those differences are based on 
genetic predispositions or cultural learning.
The premise of this article is that normal hu-
mans carry all three of the major classes of behavior 
patterns that have arisen as evolutionary adapta-
tions for different purposes — tend-and-befriend 
(caring or bonding), fi ght-or-fl ight (hyperarousal), 
and dissociative (withdrawal) patterns. Hence, the 
choices we make between activation of these pat-
terns are a matter of selective disinhibition or gene 
expression, not of natural selection. This premise 
does not hinge on the particular set of pathways out-
lined in Figures 1-3. New results on the behavioral 
functions of specifi c brain areas in many mamma-
lian species could alter some of these diagrams, but 
will not change the importance of selective gene 
expression.
Differences in capacity for caring behavior bet-
ween different people probably exist. Just as there 
are genetic differences in the strengths of brain pa-
thways involved in mathematical or motor skills, 
there are differences in the pathways involved in 
tend-and-befriend behavior. Yet cultural infl uences 
also play a strong role in causing any of these skills 
to be expressed or suppressed. Hence, ultimately our 
neural network studies should provide explanations 
for cross-cultural, training-based differences in the 
amount of caring behavior, such as Eisenberg’s 
(1992) fi nding that caring children are produced by 
societies such as the Papago Indians of Arizona in 
which parents tend to be lovingly attached to their 
children and not to use physical punishment.
The adult’s brain is less malleable than the 
child’s because no new connections are being 
made. Yet plasticity of existing connections still 
allows for social infl uences to make radical changes 
in adult patterns of caring and uncaring behavior. 
An example was Larry Trapp, a Grand Dragon of 
the Ku Klux Klan in Nebraska who converted to a 
speaker for racial tolerance (and a Jew!) as a result 
of a life-changing friendship with Michael and Julie 
Weisser, a Jewish cantor and his wife who moved 
into Trapp’s neighborhood (Dallas Morning News, 
September 9, 1992). Trapp was stunned when the 
Weissers returned his harassing hate phone calls wi-
th kindness and offers of assistance (he was going 
blind and needed help getting groceries).
The neural network approach therefore supports 
the trend among both natural and social scientists 
to discard the question “Is it nature or nurture?” in 
favor of the question “How does nurture selectively 
infl uence the expression of nature?”
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